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ABSTRACT
Specialized courts have become a key component of the legal reform packages
implemented in civil law countries, particularly, in the area of family law. One
argument for this policy is that they are able to reach a decision faster than the
regular courts, which are normally congested. We use data from a survey of
Spanish family courts in the region of Madrid to test this claim. After controlling
for other relevant variables, the econometric results did not provide strong
support for specialized courts.
INTRODUCTION
Specialized courts have become an essential component of legal reform
packages in civil law countries.' While they are less popular in common
law countries, these courts have nevertheless been emerging.2 The
widespread enthusiasm for specialized courts enjoyed by legal
policymakers is not always shared in legal academia.' Moreover, many
of the advantages of specialized courts that are emphasized by legal
policymakers have not been empirically validated. In particular, it is not
clear if specialized courts assure higher quality decisions in a shorter
time frame (ie, more efficiently than in the congested court system).
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Family law is one of the areas of law that increasingly uses specialized
courts. Not only are the social implications of family law extremely
relevant, but also the contemporary changes in marriage and divorce
behaviour have put courts under pressure. More and more people are
getting divorced. People are demanding quicker decisions. Growing
numbers of children are affected by divorce and their interests are
paramount in family law. In civil law countries, the response to the
higher rate of divorce, and the consequential impact on an already
congested court system, has been the development of a network of
specialized family courts.
4
Based on the existing literature on specialized courts, Table 1
summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of specialized courts in
family law. The balance between the advantages and disadvantages of
specialized courts is controversial. Legal scholars differ over the weight
assigned to these advantages and disadvantages.' In this article, we
investigate one of the major arguments in favour of specialized courts
in family law, namely, faster decisions in divorce and other family-
related cases. Clearly, a conclusion that specialized courts reach
decisions in a shorter period of time does not necessarily imply that
family law is better enforced. However, if specialized courts cannot
decide cases faster than regular courts, the argument for specialization
endorsed by legal policymakers is certainly less compelling.6 Therefore,
this is a crucial test.
We use data from a survey of Spanish family courts in the region of
Madrid. Spain is a particularly interesting case where specialized family
law courts have been actively pursued by legal policy.7 Furthermore,
recent law reforms have been quite relevant in this matter. First, as a
consequence of the new divorce law (Ley 15/2005, of 8July), there has
Table 1. Costs and benefits of specialized courts
Advantages Disadvantages
Higher quality of decisions (in content Administrative costs of running a new network
and in timing) of courts
Capture by specialized interests (including a
specialized bar)
Legal coherence Costs of coordination with regular courts
(include losses to incoherence between different
areas of the law and procedure)
Development of vested interests by specialized
judges and court services
Uniformity ofjudicial decisions Costs of appeal from specialized courts to
non-specialized appeal courts (depending on
the locus of specialization)
Reduction of regular courts' workload Costs of the geographical proximity of courts
to the population (since specialized courts are
usually located in large cities)
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been a significant increase in divorce by mutual consent and a
considerable reduction of litigated divorces.8 Second, a new legal
framework for domestic violence (Ley 1/2004, of 28 December) has
effectively transferred important competences concerning divorce and
family-related cases to the new specialized courts for domestic and
gender violence. Intuitively, it would seem that these changes would
have reduced the caseload pressure on family courts (since litigated
cases, such as divorce or other family-related cases with issues of custody
and alimony, require more time). On the other hand, they have also
reduced the benefits of specialization, since fewer complex cases are
actually litigated in family courts and therefore the demand for specific
knowledge from the court has decreased.
In section 2, we provide an overview of the family court system in
Spain. In section 3, we present the dataset. Section 4 will discuss the
regression analysis and section 5 provides the conclusion.
FAMILY COURTS IN SPAIN
In Spain, there are currently 76 specialized family courts across 25 (of
the existing 50) provinces. In 2004, there were 65, confirming the
current trend to expand the network of family courts. Generally,
family courts are located in the capital city of a province and have
permanent teams of psychologists and social workers to assist the
judges. Where specialized courts do not have jurisdiction, family law
is a matter of regular courts, in particular in the civil courts of first
instance in the provinces, where civil and criminal matters are
separated. Regular courts share experts on a demand basis. Madrid,
alongside Catalonia and Andalucia, are the three regions with the
highest volume of family law cases filed.9 There can be no forum
shopping in family law cases since the cases must be filed in the district
of residence of the defendant (the parties cannot choose where to
file for divorce).
Our sample includes two specialized courts in the capital city of
Madrid (Madrid 24 and Madrid 25) and two regular courts (so-called
mixed courts in Spain) from the periphery of Madrid (one from Getafe
and the other from Majadahonda). The population of the city of Madrid
is only served by specialized courts in family law matters, whereas the
population in the periphery is served by regular courts. These four
courts have been assessed by the Judicial Council' (the independent
body that runs the judiciary) as performing well." The chosen
peripheries serve the capital labour market and are to some extent
similar to the capital city in terms of demography
2 and socioeconomic 3
variables, thus making the demand for court services as homogenous as
possible.'4 This information is summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2. Some demographics
Madrid Majadahonda Getafe
GDPpc (2004) Euros 16,059.92 22,196.17 12,386.99
Average age of population (2004) Years 41.39 34.72 38.16
Population density (2004) Population/km2  5,116.93 1,516.29 1,989.76
Marriage rate (2004) Ratio 4.82 4.91 4.39
Gender rate (2004) Ratio F/M 1.13 1.09 1.01
Percentage of population with higher Percentage 24.37 43.77 12.58
education (2004)
Percentage of the population Percentage 10.32 3.61 16.18
uneducated (2001)
Percentage of votes obtained by the Percentage 50.65 62.18 39.48
center right (Popular Party) in the
2008 general election
Source: Statistics Institute, Madrid. http://w.madrid.org/iestadis/fijas/estructu/general/terr
itorio/im.htm
DATASET
The data were obtained from these four aforementioned courts for all
cases filed from 1 September 2005 to 30 August 2006. We have excluded
all filed cases that were still pending by the end of the period, a total of
77 cases (eg, cases filed in the second semester of 2006; this naturally
generates an underestimation of the average duration of a case), and
all filed cases that were rejected by the courts for procedural reasons
(21 cases). These exclusions were determined by purely operational
means since the access to the court files is manual (not by computer)
and confidential (hence limited in time by the Judicial Council).
We have coded all mutual consent cases, as well as cases subject to
litigation. They include divorces but also other family-related matters
such as separations (pre-divorce, not mandatory under the new 2005
law), changes in divorce agreements, alimony and custody agreements,
and other preliminary or provisional pre-trial issues.
There are 1,549 observations in the dataset, 1,434 cases filed in
specialized courts (100% of their workload), and 115 cases filed in
regular courts (<10% of their workload). Also, out of 1,549 cases, 68%
are by mutual consent and 32% are subject to litigation. However, of
the litigated cases, 17% were in later stages settled by mutual consent;
hence, only 15% of the cases were effectively decided by trial. Divorces
represent 84.6% of the mutual consent 16 cases but only 43.2% of cases
to be litigated.' 7 Another important difference is that while cases by
mutual consent seem to be uniformly distributed over the year, litigated
cases peak in September, October, and November. 8
The duration of a case is the period from the appropriate filing of the
case to the moment the judge makes a final decision in either the first
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Explanatory variables Mean Min (no) Max (yes)
Madrid 25 (specialized family court) 0.494 0 1
Getafe (regular court) 0.036 0 1
Majadahonda (regular court) 0.047 0 1
Minors (requires the intervention of family law 0.692 0 1
prosecutors)
Type of decision taken by the court (final sentence) 0.805 0 1
Existence of pre-trial measures 0.113 0 1
Need of expert evidence 0.123 0 1
Decision to adjourn trial at the request of at least 0.092 0 1
one of the parties
Administrative procedures that delay trial (eg, 0.189 0 1
locating one of the parties)
Change to mutual consent procedure 0.192 0 1
Legal aid lawyer 0.194 0 1
Filed in the second quarter 0.178 0 1
Filed in the third quarter 0.171 0 1
Filed in the fourth quarter 0.403 0 1
Problems wi.th court services (including change of 0.052 0 1
judge)
Error in filling 0.282 0 1
Female plaintiff 0.539 0 1
Spanish plaintiff 0.789 0 1
Employee 0.329 0 1
instance or in a second instance (for those cases that are appealed to a
higher non-specialized court). 9 We have excluded the time from thejudge's
decision to registration in the civil registrar since that is purely administrative
and outside of the control of the courts. Cases by mutual consent have an
average duration of 87 days and a standard deviation"0 of 47 days. The
corresponding figures for cases subject to litigation are 185 and 91 days,
respectively. More detailed information is provided in Table 3.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
To analyze the determinants of the duration for the proceedings in family
court, we have developed an econometric exercise that allows the
identification of the partial impact of the relevant factors on the duration.
We determine what variables explain the likelihood that each litigated
case will be concluded within a certain period of time. The reason why
we concentrate on litigated cases is because they are fundamentally the
reason why the specialized family court system developed.2 ' The duration
of cases by mutual consent is essentially driven by administrative and
other formal procedures and not the need for specific knowledge in
managing complex situations.
22
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After excluding those cases that were dropped by the plaintiff during
the process (44 cases in specialized courts and only 1 in regular courts)
and those for which we do not have information on at least one of the
relevant variables (nine cases), our final sample consisted of 380
observations. For this sub-sample, the average duration in the first instance
increased to 190 days and the standard deviation increased to 97 days.
The econometric exercise is based on an ordered probit following
Wooldridge (2003).23 This technique has been chosen given the
characteristics of the dataset, namely, the random variable not being
normally distributed or symmetrically distributed. A linear regression
model for the average duration, conditional on the explanatory
variables, could be inadequate under these circumstances. The ordered
probit seems more appropriate. We estimate the ordered probit on the
probability of a case subject to litigation being concluded before 125
days, between 126 and 175 days, between 176 and 229 days, and >229
days. This way we can identify which variables have a statistically
significant effect on duration and assess their partial impact. Table 4
summarizes the data used in the regression analysis.
We run the regression for the duration of cases in first instance. For
robustness, we repeat the exercise for the total duration of the process
(the first instance and second instance processes when appealed
24) .25
We control for the court and the quarter where the process began.
26
One of the caveats of the study is the small sample size of regular courts,
which is only 8.3% of the sampled cases. Although purely driven by
operational constraints as explained before, we believe that this
information is enough to get an idea about the differences in duration
of cases. As is shown in Table 3, most of the cases start in the fourth
quarter of the year (40.3% of the cases) .21
The variables we use to control for the complexity of the case are
the existence of minors (because it requires the intervention of family
law prosecutors, 69.2% of the cases), the existence of pre-trial
measures (in 11.3% of the cases), and the request for expert evidence
(in 12.3% of the cases). Furthermore, we include variables to account
Table 4. Non-mutual consent divorce and other litigious family procedures by duration
(dependent variable of ordered probit)
First and second instance First instance
Duration Number of observations % Number of observations %
<125 days 81 21.32 82 21.58
Between 125 and 175 days 87 22.89 93 24.47
Between 176 and 229 days 89 23.42 91 23.95
>230 days 123 32.37 114 30.00
Total 380 100.00 380 100.00
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for administrative procedures that can affect the duration of the case.
The variables accounted for, which delay trial in administrative
procedures, are
* locating one of the parties,
" making a request for a legal aid lawyer, and
" problems with court services (including change ofjudge).
Finally, error in filing is also included. That is a good proxy for the
quality of legal services offered by the lawyers.28 We have not included
the decision to change the procedure from litigation to mutual consent
(19.2% of the sample), since most of them occurred in one particular
court (Getafe), where apparently the judge actively favoured this kind
of solution. We also have collected information about individual
characteristics of the plaintiff and the defendant such as gender,
nationality, and labour status.
29
We present the main econometric results in Tables 5 and 6 0 The
baseline case 1, to which the econometric results must be compared, is
one with the following characteristics:
" filed in the first quarter in the specialized family court Madrid 24,
" being concluded with preliminary measures or dropped (hence
not reaching a final decision),
* does not require the intervention of the family law prosecutors
(hence no minors were involved),
" exhibits low complexity (no pre-trial measures or expert evidence
was requested),
" no party requested an adjourning trial,
" no administrative proceedings delayed trial, and
" no request for legal aid lawyer were made, no problems with court
services, and there were no errors in the filing.
With probit models, the estimated coefficients cannot usually be
directly interpreted. The relevant information is their sign, which
permits a qualitative evaluation. The sign of a given coefficient shows
the impact of the independent variable on the likelihood that the
duration is one of the four categories. In order to facilitate a correct
interpretation, the estimated coefficients refer to the marginal effect of
each category.
Generally, the estimated coefficients of the variables used as the
controlled variables have the expected signs. Tables 5 and 6 show (for
first instance only and for total duration, respectively) that Madrid 24
is faster than all the others, although other important variables have
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significant explanatory power. Apart from the court where the
proceedings take place, the statistically significant variables with a
positive marginal impact are the type of decision taken by the court
(final order or preliminary measures subject to later review), whether
there is a decision to adjourn at the request of one party, the existence
of administrative procedures that delay trial, and presence of errors
in filing for divorce or other family-related procedures that need to
be corrected before the proceedings start.
A negative sign means that the explanatory variable has a negative
impact on the duration of a proceeding in a family law case. For
example, the existence of minors also generates interesting results
when it is an issue in the different courts (with the interpretation that
judges are concerned with resolving the cases quickly to serve the
minors' interests). Pre-trial measures as expected have a negative sign
but are not statistically significant; the need of expert evidence,
representation by legal aid lawyer, and problems with court services as
expected have a positive sign but again do not have a statistically
significant impact.
The econometric model also provides for the probabilities of each
category of duration conditional on the explanatory variables. These
probabilities are 0.154 (<125 days), 0.293 (from 126 to 175 days),
0.290 (from 176 to 229 days), and 0.262 (>229 days) for the total
duration and 0.156 (<125 days), 0.273 (from 126 to 175 days), 0.277
(from 176 to 229 days), and 0.292 (>229 days) for duration in first
instance only.
The estimations are fairly robust to the different specifications. We
have also developed a further test of robustness by running identical
regressions with a dummy for family courts (Madrid 24 and Madrid 25)
and regular courts (Getafe and Majadahonda). As expected, the
coefficient for family courts is not statistically significant, as seen at the
bottom of Tables 5 and 6.
CONCLUSIONS
By looking at some family courts in Spain, we have assessed the extent
to which specialized courts are actually faster in reaching a decision.
This is an important test for any that is based on the higher quality of
specialized courts. The econometric evidence is not strong but seems
to point out that specialized courts (in our sample, particularly Madrid
24) could conclude litigation with a lower average duration than regular
courts (in our sample, Getafe and Majadahonda), after controlling for
other important variables. However, the overall results do not provide
strong support for the claim that specialized courts, when handling
family cases, are indeed faster.
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Obviously, these empirical results are not to be hastily generalized
since we do not have an exhaustive set of information about each case
that allows us to explore other potential relevantvariables. Furthermore,
one should not confuse assessing the duration with a fully fledged
evaluation of the merits of court specialization in family law.
Nevertheless, the results are sufficiently important to contrast with the
conventional optimism of legal policymakers for court specialization.
The results suggest caution and ask for a more comprehensive




'See Dreyfuss (1990) at pp. 393-96.
'See, among others, Posner (1983), Revesz (1989), Dreyfuss (1989), and Bagley and Revesz (2006).
'Similarly in USA and in Australia. See, eg, Babb (1998), Nicholson and Harrison (2000), and
Kelly and Fehlberg (2002).
'See, among others, supra 3.
6There is a potential trade-off between speed and quality of decisions. The balance between the
advantages and disadvantages should address this question. Broadly speaking, speed has been
presented as a major goal of court reform in Spain. For example, the new 2005 divorce law has
explicitly favoured speedier solutions to divorce and has abolished the need for prior separation
and waiting or cool-off periods.
7For a general overview, see Merino Blanco (2006) at 69.
'Family law in Spain has been reformed since the end of the Franco dictatorship in 1975 (see,
among others, de Ussel, 1991). A new law concerning marriage was passed in 1981 (Ley 30/1981,
of 7 July) to separate marriage law from canon law, hence recognizing marriage as a legal
institution of civil law. It also regulated divorce. A recent law (Ley 13/2005, of 2July) has extended
marriage to homosexual couples.
'Madrid has 11 family courts (2007) of which we study two.
"Consejo General del PoderJudicial.
"Information provided orally to the authors.
12 Marriage and gender (female to male) rates are very similar.
'"Majadahonda's population is more white-collar professionals (lawyers, medical doctors, and
university professors) who work in Madrid, whereas Getafe is more blue-collar working class who
also work in Madrid. The economic and electoral statistics reflect these different population
compositions. See the information available in Table 2.
"Ideally we would like to control for all possible variables to avoid any kind of identification
problem. Unfortunately, given the available information, that is not possible, and this was the best
approach to design the sample.
'"The significant difference in terms of workload is justified by the geographical location of the
courts and the resident population density (see Table 2 for more information). As we have noted
before, there is no forum shopping.
"There are 895 divorces, 88 pre-divorce separations, 49 alimony and custodial agreements, and
26 changes of mutually agreed family-related issues.
'"There are 212 divorces, 105 pre-trial measures, 73 not mutually agreed family-related issues,
49 alimony and custodial decisions, 23 pre-divorce separations, and other 29 family law
disputes.
"In the popular press, this excessive filing in the fourth quarter has been described as a
consequence of the post-Summer vacations' trauma.
"9The second instance consists of ordinary courts (not specialized in family law) with
jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters located in each capital of province (Audiencias
provinciales).
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2oThe standard deviation is a measure of the dispersion of the sample around the average. A low
standard deviation indicates that the individual duration of each case is close to the average; a
high standard of deviation indicates that the individual duration of each case is spread out over a
range of possible values.
" In fact, there is also a pragmatic reason. The court files are not so informative for mutual
consent cases. Even for litigated cases, we had to exclude nine cases due to lack of information
concerning at least one of the explanatory variables.
IDelay and costs can be determined by different variables. In Britain, eg, there are constructive
and structural reasons for delay but also other significant factors such as legal aid, obstructiveness
of the parties, and solicitor-induced delays. Parties might be advised by lawyers with a direct
income interest on propelling people to divorce. The evidence, however, does not seem to support
strongly such claims (Eekelaar et al, 2000), at chapter 8.
21See Wooldridge (2003). A probit model is an econometric specification for a dependent
variable that follows a binary distribution function (eg, zero if no and one if yes). An ordered
probit is a generalization of the probit model for ordinal dependent variables that follow a
multinomial distribution. The dependent variable is ranked from a list of possible values; in our
case, the probability of a case subject to litigation being concluded within a time span.
24 The number of appealed sentences is 12 (11 in specialized courts and 1 in regular courts), all
confirmed in the second instance.25We use STATA 10 for the regression analysis.
26Denoting the beginning of the case the date, the plaintiff brings the lawsuit in the form that
the court considers to be procedurally correct.
,
7 See supra 18.
21We also have information about the quantity of lawyers for each party as well as whether they
changed lawyers during the proceedings. However, they are very small numbers and, therefore,
have not been included in the regression analysis.
nWe include these variables in two of the specifications to evaluate the robustness of our results
in the working paper version, Garoupa et al (2009).
"Extended results are available at Garoupa et al (2009).
31 By baseline case in a probit regression, we describe the econometric model when each dummy
variable takes a zero value. The sign of each coefficient of the regression provides a statistical
measure of the effect (positive or negative) of that variable on the dependent variable.
32 Dummy variable for both Madrid 24 and Madrid 25 family courts.
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